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Mali: Another European Intervention 
without the EU? 
Rik Coolsaet ,  Sven Biscop and Jo Coe lmont 
As French forces are engaged in combat 
operations in Mali, even belated EU 
involvement remains crucial, to ensure that 
the intervention fits in with the political 
end-state that the EU rightly pursues. 
Since 11 January, French land and air forces, 
with military logistic support from other EU 
Member States (including Belgium, Denmark 
and the UK) have been engaged in another 
combat operation in Europe’s “broader 
neighbourhood”, in Mali. Other EU capitals, 
notably Berlin, have expressed clear political 
support. The coalition is for the moment less 
grand than that which engaged in Libya, where 
several Member States took part in the air 
campaign, though the challenges are at least as 
great, and the chances of eventual success, 
understood as lasting peace, as doubtful.  
 
Yet the French intervention was inevitable. 
Numerous factors are at play: the rapid advance 
of a coalition of local jihadist militias, together 
with an Algerian jihadist group, threatening the 
fall of the State; Mali’s neighbours’ fear of spill-
over of the eventual implosion of the Malian 
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State; French uranium interests in 
neighbouring Niger; and, what should be the 
most important of all, the very real fear of the 
people of Mali for the advancing militias. The 
French emergency operation was necessary in 
order not to jeopardize the deployment  of the 
envisaged multinational African force, acting 
under UNSC Resolution 2085, which is to 
bring peace and stability to this poverty-
stricken and conflict-prone region. Will it 
work?  
 
COMPREHENSIVE CONDITIONS FOR 
SUCCESS  
One cannot say that the French intervention is 
not in line with the broad European consensus 
on conditions for the use of force. A UN 
Resolution and a unanimous Security Council 
provide the necessary legal framework. There 
is a collective European political framework 
too, in the shape of the comprehensive Sahel 
Strategy adopted by the EU, including an 
ambitious security dimension. The main 
responsibility for stabilizing Mali lies with an 
African force, which fits in with the EU policy 
of promoting African ownership.  
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But that in itself does not guarantee success. 
Decision-makers would do well to heed some 
of the key lessons from past operations.  
 
(1) Every operation needs a clearly defined 
political objective, which can realistically be 
achieved through the envisaged military action. 
The military objectives on the ground that lead 
towards this political end-state must be as 
detailed and concrete as possible. Vague 
objectives and lofty goals (“restoring 
democracy”) lead to mission creep – elements 
of which might already be in place – and the 
risk of unknowingly getting bogged down in a 
protracted Malian guerrilla – as did happen 
before in Afghanistan (and Vietnam).  
 
(2) Foreign interventions cannot succeed 
unless their objectives fit in with local 
dynamics. Nobody but local actors can in the 
end tip the balance – foreign military, even 
from the region, cannot. In other words, Mali 
stands or falls with a credible government in 
Bamako – which today does not exist. The 
current regime came into power after a military 
coup in March 2012, which brought down a 
democratically elected government, however 
inept. It was precisely that coup that created the 
political chaos of which today’s conflict is a 
direct consequence. Jihadist militias made use 
of the political vacuum in the capital and of the 
collapse of the Malian armed forces first to gain 
control of the north of the country and then to 
start marching south. The international 
community did force the military junta to step 
aside, but the coup leader , Captain Amadou 
Sanogo, remained the strong man in Mali and 
continues to pull many of the the strings. As 
long as there is no legitimate government in 
Bamako, supported by law-abiding and credible 
armed forces, outside military intervention will 
have at best a limited and temporary impact.  
 
(3) A government is not legitimate unless it 
is perceived as such by all parts of the 
population. In Mali, this means perspectives 
should be offered to the Tuareg in the north of 
the country. Their marginalization has been a 
source of conflict in the region for decades and 
is at the heart of the conflict today. Extending 
a serious political and economic offer to the 
Tuareg is all the more urgent as one of the 
Tuareg groupings, the MNLA, has announced 
its willingness to support the military 
intervention by  engaging the jihadist militias. 
Taking into account the wide cultural and 
political gap between the south and the north 
of the country, it is far from certain though 
that Bamako (or the neighbouring countries, 
where there are important Tuareg populations 
too) will accept to address Tuareg demands 
and even less to reaffirm Tuareg self-
government, agreed upon in 1991 . If they 
would indeed be unwilling to do so, than the 
current conflict will only be the precursor of 
the next armed struggle.  
 
COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
THE EU  
The comprehensive approach that is thus 
called for is exactly what the EU Strategy for 
the Sahel envisages. It is encouraging to note 
that a strong sense that peace and stability in 
the Sahel (and in the Horn of Africa) are 
directly in the interest of the EU, and are 
therefore a European responsibility, is 
increasingly developing in Brussels and the 
capitals of the Member States alike. Which 
makes it all the more surprising that the 
current crisis management operation is a 
unilateral French, and not an EU initiative.  
 
The EU had been preparing a training 
mission (or EUTM). Its deployment has now 
been accelerated in reaction to the current 
crisis, the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in 
an extraordinary session on 17 January for that 
purpose. In line with the objective of African 
ownership and the justified reluctance to get 
directly engaged in combat, the objective of 
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EUTM has always been to train the Malian 
armed forces rather than to participate in 
operations – it is not an executive mission. If as 
far as the military dimension of the 
comprehensive approach is concerned a 
challenge can be met by deploying an EUTM 
only, which is of course the ideal scenario. This 
scenario seems to be becoming reality in 
Somalia – finally, for one should not forget that 
Somalia has been in a state of anarchy and civil 
war for two decades now.  
 
One should not nurture the illusion that 
each and every problem can be solved by 
offering training though. The rightful desire to 
keep as light a footprint as possible carries the 
risk that chances to control a problem before it 
escalates are missed. The logistic circumstances 
are very difficult, but in the Sahel, in the 
absence of heavy capabilities (especially air 
support) among the local parties, deploying 
even limited assets (notably fighter aircraft and 
helicopters) can make a big difference. That is 
exactly what France is now doing in the current 
crisis situation, its hand forced by the jihadist 
militias, in the full knowledge from the 
negotiations about EUTM that there was no 
appetite for a combat operation under the flag 
of the EU itself. The French intervention was 
immediately welcomed by London and Berlin 
among other EU capitals. The High 
Representative, Catherine Ashton, kept 
strangely quiet, not mentioning the operation in 
any of her statements on Mali until finally in a 
debate in the European Parliament on 15 
January she paid “tribute to those member 
states, particularly France, as well as the 
countries of West Africa, who have come to 
Mali’s aid”.  
 
Two conclusions can already be drawn from 
this state of affairs.  
 
(1) For now, in Mali, EU involvement 
remains vital. EUTM was conceived from the 
outset as one part of a comprehensive 
approach, linked notably to establishing 
a legitimate government in Bamako and 
inter-Malian reconciliation, code word 
for a comprehensive (and probably 
regional) political dialogue with the 
Tuareg. Only the EU can take charge of 
the various political, economic and 
humanitarian dimensions. By also fully 
supporting the French military 
intervention politically, the EU will 
strengthen its impact – and should make sure 
that it subscribes to the same political 
objectives as EUTM.  
 
(2) For the future, EU Member States must 
realize that adopting strategies goes hand in 
hand with assuming responsibility. The Sahel 
strategy is a good example of a comprehensive 
approach, without which no military 
intervention can achieve anything. But the 
opposite holds true as well: had the jihadist 
militias been allowed to march on Bamako, the 
whole strategy would have become 
meaningless. All those who subscribed to the 
Sahel Strategy ought thus to feel responsible for 
acting in the current crisis situation. But even if 
more Member States would go beyond a paper 
commitment to the Sahel strategy, today the 
EU institutions are simply not equipped to 
launch a rapid response operation of this type – 
there is no better illustration of the need for 
more permanent planning and conduct 
structures as well as intelligence assets within 
the EEAS. Then a High Representative could 
“For the EU and all of its 
Members States, it is time to live 
up to the strategies to which they 
so kindly signed up.” 
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initiate crisis response, rather than having to 
react to it (or waiting to do so).  
 
CONCLUSION  
A final modest suggestion by way of conclusion, 
to decision-makers, academia and the media 
alike. Let us this time forget the hyperboles 
about “international terrorism” and a mythical 
al-Qaeda, which no longer exists. They only 
strengthen local extremists in their conviction 
that they are part of a mighty international 
movement against the West – and that the 
Malian militias definitely are not. Mali is part of 
Europe’s “broader neighbourhood”, where 
peace and stability, or the absence thereof, has 
an impact on our vital interests, but the militias 
are no vital threat to western civilization. They 
are a very real threat to the average Malian 
citizen though, and that should be sufficient 
reason for us to care. For the EU and all of its 
Members States, time to live up to the strategies 
to which they so kindly signed up. 
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